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THE NEW YORK TIMES RULE-THE AWAKENING GIANT
OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Historical Background
The founders of our country believed that freedom of the press
was one of the cornerstones upon which our democratic form of gov-
emnment should be based. Few principles have been defended with
such ardor and prosaic vigor, as evidenced by one particularly
articulate statement of Chief Justice John Marshall:
Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among those
sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty,
which the Government contemplates with awful reverance and
would approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there
is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the
public mind than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often
carried to excess, that it has sometimes degenerated into licentious-
ness, is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been
discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with
which it is allied .... 1
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions reveal that the prin-
ciple has not only remained steadfast, but has also grown stronger,
perhaps stronger than its proponents anticipated. This expansion may
be attributed not so much to a conscious extension of the freedom
as to a redefining of its scope to conform to the practical realities of
a changing society.
A defamatory statement is usually defined as one which tends to
hold a party up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to
be avoided by others.2 The forerunners of the modem tort of
defamation were based upon the premise that one's good name and
reputation are of sufficient value to be afforded legal protection.3 At
first, injuries of this nature were under the jurisdiction of the seignorial
or local manor court, but as this court fell into disrepute, the claim
1 AmERiCAN STATE PAPERS, 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS 196 (U.S. Cong. 1832).
This was Chief Justice Marshall's reply to Tallyrand's complaints concerning
American newspapers. This same statement was quoted with approval by James
Madison, 6 WRITINGS OF JAMEs MADISON, 1790-1802, at 836 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
2W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 111, at 739 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROssER]. See generally Kemmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 186 N.E. 287
(N.Y. 1933); Lewis v. Williams, 89 S.E. 647 (S.C. 1916).
3 See 1 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMtENrrs 378 (Whitebook ed. 1955), citing
to a forerunner of defamation in the Laws of Alfred the Great, Law No. 32 (circa
880 A.D.).
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came within the purview of the ecclesiastical courts,4 which regarded
such defamatory actions as a sin and imposed a penance upon the
defaming sinner. With the decline of the ecclesiastical courts the
claim for defamation drifted into the common law courts5 where it
was received with disfavor by many judges, who considered defama-
tion to be merely a violation of moral ethics. However, as English
civilization advanced, this common law cause of action developed into
a peaceful alternative to the self-help remedies of dueling and
revenge which were often resorted to by certain classes of society.
6
This development was further strengthened by the emergence of a
mercantile class whose members had little inclination to resort to
arms to defend their good names and reputations.7 During the early
seventeenth century, the infamous Court of Star Chamber was in-
strumental in punishing the crime of seditious libel;8 however, when
this court was abolished, jurisdiction over defamation actions became
vested absolutely in the common law courts.9
With the settlement of the American colonies the English tort of
defamation became implanted in our legal system. Although this tort
in many instances appears to directly affront the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and press, it has survived for over
two hundred years. Attempts to reconcile these seemingly conflicting
principles have been frought with difficulties and often have been
the subject of tempestuous dispute.' 0 The resolution of this conflict
can be achieved only by counterbalancing the belief that freedom
of speech and press is a basic tenet of a well informed democracy
with the realization that truly defamatory statements can so injure a
person as to require legal redress.
The validity of the common law tort of defamation has been chal-
4 For extensive treatment of the historical development of the lawv of
defamation see Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wisc. L. REV. 99; Lovell,
The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VA ,D. L. Rzv. 1051 (1962);
Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 8 CoLTJm. L. Rmv. 546
(1903).
GVeeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L. REv.
546, 550 (1903).
6 Even though this remedy at law existed, the rich and powerful often favored
direct action by resorting to arms. Lovell, The Reception of Defamation by the
Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1052 (1962).
7 The invention of the printing press and the development of the mercantile
class have been suggested as the major reasons for the increased popularity of
defamation actions. Id. at 1058.
s During this period the absolute monarchy began to realize the potential of
the printing press, and these prosecutions flourished.
9 Veeder, supra note 5, at 547.
10 See generally Green, Slander and Libel, 6 AM. L. REv. 592 (1872); Leflar,
The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1073 (1962); Pound, Equitable
Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HIAv. L. Riv. 640
(1916).
1974]
KENTUCKY LAW JOUENAL
lenged on numerous occasions, but the United States Supreme Court
has specifically upheld its constitutionality." One rationale adopted
by the Court was that the first amendment was intended only to
prohibit future abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press
while impliedly sanctioning the then existing common law actions as
exceptions to the constitutional proscription.12
Until 1964 the tort of defamation was, with some exceptions,
within the realm of state law.13 During this period a majority of the
states held that misstatements based upon erroneous facts submitted
the conveyor of these statements to liability;14 the minority view
imposed no liability if the person making the erroneous statement
had acted in good faith.15 Under either rule, actions for defamation
were subject to the defenses of truth, absolute privilege and con-
ditional privilege. Absolute privilege was applicable to statements
made in judicial and legislative proceedings, executive communica-
tions, statements made with the consent of the party asserting
defamation, and communications between husband and wife. Con-
ditional privilege extended to statements protecting one's own interest
or the interests of others, communications to those acting in the
public interest, and fair comment upon matters of public concern.16
The last of these areas of conditional privilege, fair comment on
matters of public concern, is of particular importance and will be
dealt with extensively in the discussion that follows.
With the advent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'7 the legal
concept of freedom of the press in juxtaposition with the tort of
defamation changed substantially. 18 The purpose of this note is to
11 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
12 See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897). Justice Brown, in
delivering the opinion of the court, discussed this principle of constitutional in-
terpretation.
'3 See, e.g., Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (May 16, 1918);
Sedition Act of 1798, ch. IXXIV, 1 Stat. 596 (July 14, 1798). Although these acts
were only temporarily in force, they did have certain prohibitions against what
resembled national libel.
14Burt v. Advertiser Co., 28 N.E. 1 (Mass. 1891) is an early case typifying
this approach. See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937) and Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358
(1944), listing 27 states which follow this majority view and 13 which follow the
minority view. See also Noel, Defamation of Public Officials and Candidates, 49
CoLTM . L. REv. 875, 896 (1949).
15 The leading decision articulating this view is Coleman v. MacLellan, 98 P.
281 (Kan. 1908). See also Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 312 P.2d 150 154
(Ariz. 1957); Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Mich. 1959); Ponder v.
Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 80 (N.C. 1962).
16 See generally PRossan, §§ 114-16; REsTATmrENT OF ToRTs §§ 592, 613
(1938).
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18 Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and
Walker, 1967 Sui'. CT. REv. 267. In this article the author expresses the view that
New York Times has greatly changed the first amendment area. Id. at 269.
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analyze the scope of the change, the reasons for it, and the results
stemming therefrom.
The Break with Traditional Notions
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 the legal world was stunned. This holding
imposed a federal rule which greatly limited liability under certain
circumstances upon an area of law which had been under state
jurisdiction since the beginnings of this country. The decision was
likened to a "bombshell" 20 and called a "happy revolution of free
speech doctrine."21 One legal writer hailed it as "the greatest victory
for tort defendants in the history of modem law."22 Before dealing
with subsequent extensions of the New York Times rule, it is necessary
to analyze the case in depth to isolate some of the reasons for the
Court's startling departure from tradition. Once these reasons can
be discerned, later cases which extended the rule can be properly
analyzed.
23
The suit was brought against the New York Times and others for
defamation by the publication of a full page advertisement entitled
"Heed Their Rising Voices,"24 the purpose of which was to raise
funds for the defense of Dr. Martin Luther King. Most of the
advertisement was editorial in nature and documented the mistreat-
ment which Dr. King and others had suffered at the hands of police
during a protest in Montgomery, Alabama. The Police Commissioner
of Montgomery brought suit for libel against the New York Times and
four sponsors of the advertisement who were amenable to service in
Alabama.2 5 Alabama followed the majority rule which allowed de-
famatory opinions as fair comment only if these opinions were based
upon true facts. 26 Since at least eight statements in the advertisement
19 376 U.S. 254 (1964).2 0 PRosSEH § 118 at 819.
21 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the
First Amendment 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 205.2 2 PnOSSEa, § 118 at 819.
23 1For other analysis see Barney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Con-
stitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191;
Meildejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEo. L.J. 234 (1967);
Comment, Defamation of Public Officials-Coleman v. MacLellan Revisited, 13
KAN. L. REv. 399 (1965); Comment, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-The Scope
of a Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 106 (1965); Note, Recent Developments Concerning
Constitutional Limitations on State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429
(1967).
24 A reproduction of this advertisement is found in 376 U.S. 254, appendix I,
at 292.
25 Facts are taken from the Court's Opinion. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 256-64 (1964).2 6 See notes 14-15 and accompanying text, supra.
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were untrue or at least highly inaccurate, 27 the trial court held that
the article was defamatory as a matter of law. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $500,000, and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed.2 8 The United States Supreme Court unan-
imously reversed with the majority opinion of six justices holding
that the Alabama law was constitutionally deficient in failing to protect
first amendment rights as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Specifically, the law failed to provide a qualified privilege
for honest misstatements of facts concerning public officials where no
actual malice could be shown.29 The Court defined actual malice as
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."80 This essentially was the test which had been
applied by the minority of the states prior to New York Times.31
Given only the bare facts in the case it is difficult to understand
why the Supreme Court departed from accepted traditions to hold the
first amendment protections were applicable to defamation. Decisions
with such broad impact are not made without compelling reasons,
32
but to identify these reasons it is necessary to analyze not only the
facts of the case but also the social issues that surrounded it.
One important peripheral consideration is that the case was in-
timately connected with the civil rights movement, arising at a time
when our country was embroiled in bitter controversy. If the Alabama
judgment had been allowed to stand, it requires little imagination to
predict its ramifications upon the civil rights movement.33 Editorials
and paid advertisements which contained slight inaccuracies or in-
nocent misstatements could have been construed to be outside the
privilege of fair comment, thereby subjecting publishers and con-
tributors to a libel action. This would have been disastrous during a
27 At least one author has asserted that although these eight statements were
"inaccurate," there was at least a core of truth to them and that such errors were
merely those common to hastily drafted advertisements. Kalven, supra note 21, at199. 28 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962), rev'd 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
293 76 U.S. at 279-83.
30 Id. t 280.
31 See supra note 15.
32 It has been suggested that this constitutes a direct departure from past Con-
stitutional development, surmounting rather than interpreting the Constitution.
The Court could have used other judicial tools to overturn this verdict, by holding
that such a huge judgment was a 'patent miscarriage of justice" or that relationship
between the verdict and the evidence was so nebulous as to constitute denial of due
process. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 587 (1964).
3The Court recogmzes this when stating that the advertisement is "an ex-
pression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time."
New York Time Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
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critical period when the country needed more open debate and less
violence.
The size of the damage award in this case is another factor which
may have influenced the Court's decision. Although the $500,000
judgment was large, it would not have economically jeopardized the
New York Times. However, the sub-issue in this case was whether
the newspaper could survive a series of such judgments,34 since law-
suits relating to the same advertisement had been filed by four other
Alabama officials. One of these lawsuits had resulted in an identical
$500,000 verdict, and the remaining three were seeking a total of
$2,000,000 in damages. Thus, the defendant newspaper could have
been liable for three million dollars, a very oppressive amount in light
of the fact that only 394 copies of the relevant edition were circulated
in Alabama only 35 of which were disseminated in and around the
Montgomery area.3
5
At common law, freedom of the press meant the absence of
restraints prior to publication and had no application to liability
arising after publication.36 The Court specifically rejected this view
in New York Times by recognizing the inhibiting effect of damage
awards which can be so formidable as to be "a form of regulation
that creates hazards to protected freedoms, markedly greater than
those that attend reliance upon the criminal law."3 7 The verdict
seemed odious to the Court not only because of its amount and
potential inhibiting effect but also because under the common law of
libel, unlike other torts, general damages are presumed and need not
be proven.
38
The third issue of concern for the Court was the fact that while
truth is a defense in libel actions, the burden of proving truth is upon
the defendant. The Court reasoned that placing such a burden upon
one who criticizes a public official could result in a significant
amount of self-censorship:
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed
to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having
to do so .... The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits of the
variety of public debate.39
34 Id. at 278, n.18.
35 Id. at 260 n.3.3 6 See 4 BLACKSTONE, COrOuENRs, *151-53.
37 376 U.S. at 278.
38 PROSSER, § 112, at 754.
39 376 U.S. at 279.
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In considering these dangers of self-censorship the Court exhibited
special commitment to the first amendment freedoms by piercing
legal theory and scrutinizing the practical ramifications of defamation
actions. The Court, in an apparent attempt to soothe any who might
be uneasy about its holding, bolstered its decision by stating that the
case was analogous to Barr v. Matteo,40 wherein it had held that a
federal official was absolutely privileged with respect to any statement
made "within the outer perimeter" of his duties.41 Therefore, reasoned
the Court, the holding in New York Times merely gives the private
citizen a reciprocal privilege when criticizing public officials.42
The Supreme Court reached its decision in New York Times43 only
after considering all of the above factors: the inhibiting effect of large
money judgments; the burden put upon the defendant of having to
prove the truth of factual allegations; the inherent danger of self-
censorship; and the connection of the case to the civil rights movement.
In enunciating the rule that public officials could not recover for
defamatory comments about their official conduct absent a showing
of actual malice, it was necessary for the Court to break with the
past in order to protect first amendment rights and the spirit of robust
debate. However, in the aftermath of the case there were many
unanswered questions, 44 the most crucial of which was: Did the New
York Times rule define the outer limits within which the Court would
protect first amendment freedoms, or did it merely establish a starting
point for further expansion?
Times Keeps on Ticking
An examination of the major defamation cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court since New York Times reveals that the rule has not
been limited to a particular fact pattern. It is vitally alive and has
been substantially expanded; indeed, the New York Times rule may
become a cornerstone of our modem first amendment freedoms.
403 60 U.S. 564 (1959).
41Id. at 575.
4 2 
It should be noted that although the Court says reciprocal privilege, the
privilege in Barr is much greater because it is not subject to 'actual malice.' The
Court in a later case states that this dicta was in no way intended to link the New
York Times rule with that of official privilege. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85
n.10 (1966).
43The Court clearly states that it has considered this case against the back-
ground of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open.' New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
44ne glaring omission was the Court's failure to define "public official." Id.
at 283 n.23. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). the Court states that
public officials refers to: "at the very least to those among the hierarchy of govern-
ment employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsi-
bility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Id. at 85.
[Vol 62
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Whether the Supreme Court anticipated this extension is unclear, but
it is interesting to note that in the New York Times opinion the Court
stated that first amendment freedoms must have sufficient "breathing
space" if they are to survive.45 Perhaps this term reflects what the
Court in later opinions articulated: that as our society changes, our
perceptions of certain freedoms and the protections which they afford
us must also change to prevent the attrition of those freedoms. In a
society such as ours, which daily grows more complex, a real risk
exists that certain traditional aspects of the law of defamation might
extinguish freedom of the press.46 This is especially true if we do not
continually reexamine the freedom with regard to our society, the
size and scope of the communication media, and the methods used
for dissemination of information.
In tracing the expansion of the New York Times rule, the first case
to be considered is Time, Inc. v. Hill,47 which raises some analytical
problems because it involved a right of privacy claim under a New
York statute rather than a libel action. Although the Court did not
directly equate the two cases, New York Times undeniably influenced
the decision in Hill. The defendant, Life magazine, published
an account of a play, giving the impression that it depicted the
real life experiences of the Hill family. The plaintiff brought suit
under a New York statute which provided a cause of action to one
whose name was used for purposes of trade or advertising without
his consent.48 Life countered that the article was of general interest
and published in good faith. At the original trial Hill was awarded
both compensatory and punitive damages; liability was sustained on
appeal, but a new trial was ordered on the issue of damages. At the
second trial, the plaintiff was awarded only compensatory damages,
and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
In reversing the New York Court, the United States Supreme
Court first held that when there is sufficient public interest or
newsworthiness in the subject matter of a publication, it may be
removed from exclusive state scrutiny and first amendment protections
are applied.49 Based upon this rationale, the Court held that in this
case constitutional protections prohibited the application of the New
York statute and that redress for false reports of a matter of public
45 376 U.S. at 272.
46See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 180, 163-64 (1967) (Warren,
C. J., concurring).
47385 U.S. 374 (1966).
48 N.Y. CnrM Rioirrs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948). For the New York
interpretation of this law see Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 451
(1965); aff'd 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966).49 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1966).
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interest can only be obtained upon a showing of knowing falsity or
reckless disregard of the truthY° In Hill the focus was not on the
status of the individual, as in New York Times, because the decisive
factor seems to have been the news value of the subject matter of
the publication. Once again the Court showed great concern for
protecting first amendment freedoms:
[S]anctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement
would present a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exer-
cising the constitutional guarantees.
51
In Hill the Court arrived at a New York Times result without spe-
cifically relying on that case as precedent.5 2 As previously mentioned,
this case does not fit easily into the pattern established by New York
Times and the later defamation cases. It is clearly within the chain
of development, but it will not fit into an analytical niche. The most
plausible suggestion for this result is that the case involved a right of
privacy action brought by a plaintiff who was not within the public
domain. There would seem to have been many hurdles for the Supreme
Court to overcome in order to hold New York Times applicable to
these facts.
53
The fact situations in the next defamation cases before the Court,
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker,54
more closely conformed to the New York Times context. In Butts, the
athletic director of the University of Georgia brought suit against the
Saturday Evening Post for an article which stated that he had conspired
with Paul Bryant of the University of Alabama to fix a football game
between the two schools. The story was based upon an alleged
telephone conversation during which Butts purportedly gave play
secrets to Bryant."5 Butts brought suit and was awarded $60,000
compensatory damages and $3,000,000 punitive damages; however, on
remittur the punitive damages were reduced to $400,000.56 This judg-
ment was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.57 In Walker,
retired General Edwin Walker sued the Associated Press over a wire
release which stated that during a disruption on the University of
Mississippi campus, General Walker had assumed command of a
50 Id. at 390.
51 Id. at 389.52 The Court specifically states that its holding is not a blind application of
New York Times. Id. at 390.
53 Kalven, supra note 18, at 280.
54 Decided together, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
55 Facts are taken from the Court's opinion. Id. at 135-40.
56 The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351
F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 19655).
57 388 U.S. at 161.
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crowd and personally led a charge against federal marshals. General
Walker received a verdict of $500,000 compensatory damages and
$300,000 punitive damages, but the trial judge struck the punitive
damages on the grounds that there was no evidence of malice. The
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment,5  but the United States
Supreme Court reversed and ordered a judgment for the defendant.59
Clearly, in these cases the Court could not classify either plaintiff
as a public official within the doctrine of New York Times. Butts was
paid not by the University but by a private organization, and General
Walker had retired from the service. For this reason the trial courts
in these cases had refused to find New York Times applicable. The
Supreme Court did find that both parties were public figures, stating
that Butts may have acquired "the status by position alone and
Walker by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his
personality into the vortex of an important public controversy."60
Once this shifting of status characterization is made, it would seem
logical for the Court to apply the New York Times test. However, in
Butts, Justice Harlan, who delivered the Court's opinion, compromised
for a type of "reasonable man" test for liability. Apparently believing
that the facts of this case did not warrant application of the stringent
New York Times standard, he proposed a test which was more lenient
toward plaintiffs seeking recovery:
[T]bat a "public figure" who is not a public official may also recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers.
61
This new test is somewhat misleading because Justice Harlan spoke
for only a plurality of the Court: Justices Clark, Stewart, Fortas and
himself. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and White
believed that if any test was to be utilized, it should be the "actual
malice" test of New York Times, while Justices Black and Douglas
saw no valid reason for evolving another constitutional rule.62 Chief
58 Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1965).
59 388 U.S. at 162.
60 Id. at 155.
61 Id.
62 It should be noted that Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in Walker
and dissenting in Butts, still maintain that the first amendment protects the press
absolutely from libel prosecution. Admittedly if the majority of the Court is going
to evolve a test, these Justices would prefer the more stringent requirements of
New York Times. See infra note 112.
Justice Black berates his brethren when he states that the Court is making a
(Continued on next page)
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Justice Warren, concurring in Butts, used the "actual malice" test to
give the needed majority. In Walker, all nine Justices voted to reverse,
believing that the facts of this case failed to meet either the "actual
malice" test or the "reasonable man" test.
One may reasonably wonder why opposite results were reached in
cases with analogous fact patterns involving gross factual errors which
resulted in injury to the plaintiffs' reputation. From the opinions of
the Justices affirming Butts, it is obvious that to them there was a
crucial distinction. In Butts, although the article had been prepared
over a long period of time, little effort was made to authenticate the
facts upon which it was based. Moreover, the Court recognized that
the Saturday Evening Post was seeking to increase sales by embarking
upon a policy of "sophisticated muckraking."63 In view of these facts,
a finding of unreasonable conduct could be supported. The facts in
Walker militated toward an opposite finding. The reporter who filed
the story was supposedly competent and trustworthy, and the nature
of the report was "hot news;"64 so there was little time to check its
veracity before release. Since the primary function of a wire service
such as the Associated Press is rapid dissemination of news events,
the facts of Walker did not represent an unreasonable departure from
good reporting practices.
At least one writer after Butts and Walker has commented that
the Court did not find Time, Inc. v. Hill controlling in those cases.615
Hill, a right of privacy action, had focused upon the subject matter of
the suit and its newsworthiness, declaring that liability should be
imposed only when "actual malice" could be shown. Clearly an
analogy could have been made to Hill although Butts and Walker
were libel suits,66 since the key issue in all three cases was the extent
to which the Court will extend first amendment protections to safeguard
the press from liability based upon factually erroneous reporting.
Perhaps the broad scope of the newsworthiness test announced in
Hill was difficult for the Court to apply, which necessitated a return
to classifying the privilege in light of the status of the injured plaintiff,
rather than according to the subject matter of the publication. Re-
gardless of the reason for the Court's shift, it is apparent from the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
quagmire of libel law just as it has obscenity law. "No one, including this Court,
can kow what is and what is not constitutionally obscene or libelous under this
Court's ruling." 388 U.S. at 171 (Black, J. concurring in Walker and dissenting in
Butts).
63 388 U.S. at 158.
64 Id.
65 Kalven, supra note 18, at 286.
66 See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
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rationale of the opinion expressed in Butts and Walker that the
underlying reasons for the New York Times decision were considered
by a majority of the Court.
The foregoing cases evidence the gradual development of an
expanded protection for the press under the first amendment and a
concomitant increase in restrictions upon the application of traditional
libel concepts. In Butts, both the plurality "reasonable man" test and
the concurring Justice's adherance to the New York Times rule were
attempts to ease the tension between first amendment freedoms and
individual rights by giving sufficient "breathing space" to the press.6 7
The lengths to which the Court has been willing to go to accomplish
this goal can only be ascertained by analyzing subsequent case hold-
ings.
The Supreme Court during the 1971 term again considered the
conflict between common law libel and first amendment freedoms. In
three cases banded down together-Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,68 Ocala
Star-Banner v. Damron,69 and Time, Inc. v. Pape70-the Court ex-
tended the New York Times doctrine as a bulwark between these two
competing forces. The extension of the doctrine was not surprising,
since all three plaintiffs were clearly public officials, but the holdings
of the Court were of sufficient breadth to be of significant im-
portance.
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 71 the plaintiff was a candidate in a
primary election for the United States Senate. Several days before the
election, the defendant newspaper carried a syndicated column in
which plaintiff was referred to as a "former small-time bootlegger."72
Plaintiff lost in his bid for the primary nomination and subsequently
brought suit. The information complained of had been given to
columnist Drew Pearson by one of his sources. Investigation proved
that the report was totally false and that it actually referred to the
alleged activities of plaintiff's brother during prohibition. The trial
court correctly instructed the jury that the plaintiff was a public
official within the definition established by the United States Supreme
Court. However, the court further instructed the jury that if they
found the libel to concern the private sector of plaintiff's life, then the
"actual malice" test of New York Times was not applicable and only
the traditional defenses of truth or conditional privilege would protect
67 388 U.S. at 151.
68401 U.S. 265 (1971).
69 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
70 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
71401 U.S. 265 (1971).72 Facts are taken from Court's opinion. Id. at 266-70.
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the defendant from liability. The jury determined that the libel
related not to official conduct but to the plaintiff's private affairs and
found the defendant liable. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
upheld the trial judge's instructions and affirmed the judgment.7
The United States Supreme Court unanimously voted to reverse and
remand, stating that the jury instructions were improper. The Court
held New York Times applicable to candidates seeking public office
and declared that the privilege delineated therein encompassed any-
thing pertaining to the candidate's fitness to hold that office."4 Re-
garding the specific allegation of libel then before it, the Court held
that
as a matter of constitutional law.., a charge of criminal conduct
no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to
an official's or a candidate's fitness for office for purposes of ap-
plication of the . . . rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.75
This is a considerable expansion of the concept of "official conduct"
as enunciated in New York Times76 and clearly indicates the Court's
determination that the ordinary definition of those terms is insufficient
to protect first amendment guarantees. 77 Moreover, the Court con-
cluded that adherence to traditional tort concepts in a political
campaign might severely threaten freedom of speech and freedom of
the press.78 The direct consequence of this decision is that one vho
enters the political arena must be prepared to endure severe and
possibly erroneous attacks79 which will give rise to liability only upon
a showing of actual malice.
The second case, Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron,80 presented a situa-
tion remarkably similar to Monitor Patriot Co. Plaintff, a city mayor
seeking election to another public office, was both a public official
and a candidate for public office. Defendant newspaper published
an article which stated that plaintiff was then under indictment for
perjury in federal court, when in fact it was his brother who was so
charged. The newspaper printed retractions, but the plaintiff lost
73 Roy v. Monitor Patriot Co., 254 A.2d 832 (N.H. 1969).
74 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276 (1971); Cf. Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 861 U.S. 147 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
75401 U.S. at 277.
76 This broad principle could have some very shocking results, in light of many
state laws which have fallen into disuse but are still technically crimes, e.g., statutes
prohibiting certain consensual acts between husband and wife. See Comment, The
Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liability for
Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MicrH. L. REv. 1547, 1552
(1970).
77401 U.S. at 274-75.
78 Id.
79 See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COL ,S. L. REv.
875 (1949).
80 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
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the election and subsequently brought suit.81 The trial court ruled
that the publication was libelous per se and instructed the jury to
determine damages. It further ruled that New York Times was not
applicable because the erroneous publication was not related to plain-
tiffs status as a public official or to his official conduct. The jury
awarded damages, and the Florida Supreme Court refused to review
the judgment.8 2 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court unan-
imously reversed and remanded, the majority holding that the New
York Times test was applicable . 3 The Court made it clear that a
plaintiff comes under this rule whether he is characterized as a public
official or as a candidate for public office and that a criminal charge
of perjury is always relevant under the broad definition of official
conduct enunciated in Monitor Patriot Co.84
The third case of this trilogy, Time, Inc. v. Pape, 5 involved
slanting of facts in a second-hand report rather than a blatant case
of reporting erroneous facts. The original report, issued by the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, had cited a Chicago case of police
brutality as involving a typical description of alleged police miscon-
duct. 6 The description contained in the report was given by the
party alleging misconduct and was not the finding of the Commission.
The defendant, Time magazine, restated these allegations of brutality
as actual fact in an article based upon the Commission's report.
Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape, one of the original defendants in a
civil rights suit 87 stemming from the alleged misconduct, filed a libel
suit against Time,88 which arrived at the Supreme Court only after
having been reversed three times by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. At the first trial the district court granted a motion for dis-
missal on the grounds that the "fair comment" privilege of Illinois
governed and precluded liability. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed.89 During this period New York Times was
decided, so at the second trial the district court granted summary
judgment based upon New York Times, but the Court of Appeals
again reversed, holding that there must be a trial to determine
whether defendant's conduct constituted "actual malice."90 On remand,
plaintiff presented his case, which included testimony by a Time
8 1 Facts are taken from Court's opinion. Id. at 295-99.
82 Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 231 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1970).
83 401 U.S. at 300.
84 Id.
85 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
80 Justice; Search, Seizure and Violence: Chicago, 1958 in 5 REPORT OF TBE
UrrrED STATFS CommssioN ON CrvIL Ricsrs 20-21 (1961).
87 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).8 8 Facts are taken from Court's opinion. Id. at 280-83.
8 9 Pape v. Time, Inc., 318 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1963).
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researcher that she was conscious of the omission of the word "alleged"
at the time of publication but nonetheless believed the article pre-
sented the truth. At close of plaintiff's case the district court ordered
a directed verdict for the defendant,91 but again the Seventh Circuit
reversed, stating that actual malice was a jury issue. 2 The United
States Supreme Court held that defendant's conduct in failing to state
that the facts set forth in the article were mere allegations was not
sufficient falsification to constitute a jury issue. 3
The issue in Pape, unlike its two companions, was not whether
plaintiff was a public official or whether the publication concerned
official conduct. Plaintiffs sole contention was that defendant's
knowing ommission of the word "alleged" constituted an issue as
to actual malice-that is, "knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth."14 The Court, although careful to recognize the problems that
can arise in this type of second-hand reporting, especially when the
original report relied upon may be a combination of facts, beliefs,
and attitudes, 95 rejected the plaintiff's argument and concluded that:
"Time's omission of the word 'alleged' amounted to the adoption of
one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document
that bristled with ambiguities."9 The Court cautioned that nothing
in its opinion was intended to mean that the word "alleged" had be-
come superfluous, 97 although the validity of this statement is ques-
tionable in light of the result of the case. Perhaps the Court was
contemplating the conscious omission of that adjective when com-
menting that a less ambiguous report might give rise to a ques-
tion of actual malice.
It is interesting to note that in none of the above three cases did
the Court refer to whether the publications attacked as libelous were
"hot news" or whether the misstatements were such that the errors
could easily have been detected by reasonable investigation incident
to normal standards of publication. In all three instances the plaintiffs
were public officials or candidates and thus within the scope of New
York Times; either the Court was adhering to a delineation between
public figures and public officials or else this demonstrates the weak-
ness of the plurality test in Butts and Walker discussed above.
As a result of these cases, libel actions are available to public
90 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965).
91 Pape v. Time, Inc. 294 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1969).9 2 Pape v. Time, Inc., 419 F.2d 980 7th Cu. 1969).
9 3 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (971).
94 Id. at 283-84.
95 Id. at 286.
96 Id. at 290.
97 Id. at 292,
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officials or candidates for public office only when erroneous publica-
tions are blatant and malicious, or, as in Butts, are so heedless of care
as to convey a reckless disregard for the truth. This restriction of libel
has been molded by the Court to protect those who seek to exercise
first amendment freedoms from prosecution for non-intentional error.
Although the cases expanded the New York Times rule, they do
not resolve a crucial question: What influence does freedom of the
press have on the rights of a private individual who holds no public
office, who is not seeking election and who has not achieved any
substantial degree of notoriety? This question was considered by the
Supreme Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.98 wherein the spec-
trum of New York Times was enlarged to cover the private individual.
In Rosenbloom, plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, was ar-
rested on obscenity charges while making delivery to a newsstand.
Three days after plaintiffs arrest his home and warehouse were
searched pursuant to a valid search warrant, and additional magazines
were seized. After he was arrested a second time, he sought injunctive
relief in federal court to stop further police interference with his
business.
Rosenbloom was eventually acquitted of all obscenity charges
and brought suit in federal court under Pennsylvania libel law"0
against a radio station owned by Metromedia, Inc. He sought relief
on two grounds: (1) that the radio station, in reporting his second
arrest and the confiscation of his books, had said that the books were
obscene rather than "allegedly or reportedly" obscene; and (2) that
in commenting on his federal injunctive suit, the station, though not
mentioning plaintiff by name, had stated that the action was brought
to get police to lay off "the smut literature racket" and had referred
to those bringing the suit as "girlie book peddlers." 100 He was awarded
$25,000 general damages and $750,000 punitive damages; however,
the punitive damages were reduced on remittur to $250,000.101 The
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that New York Times was
applicable and that plaintiff failed to meet the prescribed standard
of showing actual malice.102 Rosenbloom appealed the decision on
the narrow grounds that he was not a public official or public figure
and that therefore the New York Times standard did not apply to his
case.103 He argued that there must be a distinction between private
90 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
09PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 12, § 1584a (Supp. 1971).
100 Facts are taken from Court's opinion. 403 U.S. at 36-42.01 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
10 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1969).
103 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40-41. (1971).
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and public figures because private individuals do not have the ready
access to the media necessary to refute libelous statements made
about them.104 The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that
the chance to reply hinges not upon the status of the individual, but
upon the "unpredictable event of the media's continuing interest." 10
Petitioner next argued that this public/private distinction was neces-
sary to give full protection to the underlying values of libel law-the
desire for privacy and the protection of one's good name and reputa-
tion.10 The Court, though recognizing the importance of protecting
these values, stated that even such protected interests must sometimes
yield to other important social goals.'10 First amendment rights,
reasoned the Court, are sufficiently important to outweigh the under-
lying values of traditional libel laws. The Court further concluded
that the reasonable care standard advanced by the petitioner would
be too elusive in the hands of a jury to give requisite "breathing space"
to first amendment freedoms. 10 8 Thus, the stringent "actual malice"
test was recognized as the only sufficient method of protecting these
freedoms. Therefore the determinative factor in applying New York
Times is not the status of the plaintiff as a public official, public candi-
date, public figure, or private citizen, but rather whether the de-
famatory utterances related to the complaining party's involvement
in an event of public or general concern.109
This shifting of emphasis from the status of a plaintiff under a
New York Times disability to the series of events which create the
disability is a functionally sound approach. Conceivably, the Court
could have held that Rosenbloom was a public figure because he was
in the news, but this would have made anyone in the news a public
figure and would have rendered the whole classification system mean-
ingless." 0 In adopting the new approach the Court seems to have
relied on two basic premises. First, in our complex modem society
and age of mass media there is seldom a distinct delineation between
the public and private sectors. On the contrary, there is an expanding
gray area in that whenever a person becomes involved in a truly
104 1d. at 45.
105 Id. at 46.
106 Id. at 45.
107 Id. at 50.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 44. The test is in essence that which the Court had announced in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1966), a right of privacy action, but had refused
to apply in libel cases until the instant case.
110 See Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 840 (1968), where Judge Madden stated
that logically a public figure is "anyone who is famous or infamous because of who
he is or what he has done." Id. at 419.
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newsworthy matter he becomes a pseudo-public figure for a time.111
This sometimes narrow distinction between public and private is
therefore too nebulous a basis to support a constitutional principle
designed to protect first amendment freedoms.
To properly comprehend the future ramifications of Rosenbloom,
it is essential to note the divergence of opinion among the Justices
of the Court. These separate opinions are important indicators of
possible avenues of change should the Court ever shift or redefine its
decision. The main opinion discussed above represented the views
of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Blackmun; the five
man majority was obtained by the concurrance in the result of Justices
Black and White. Justice Black, enunciating the view that he had
maintained since before New York Times, declared that "the First
Amendment does not permit recovery of libel judgments against
the news media even when these statements are broadcast with the
knowledge that they are false."" 2
Justice White was concerned that the main opinion was too
sweeping in its effect upon state libel law, but concurred on the
grounds that absent "actual malice" the media may comment fully
upon any official action of public officials in the performance of their
duties.113 He found this test applicable to Rosenbloom, since de-
fendant's reports concerned an arrest and a confiscation by public
officials. Further, he found no requirement that an individuals
reputation or right of privacy be spared when official action is involved,
a rather broad statement if pursued to the extreme."14
The dissent of Justices Stewart and Marshall was based on their
desire to maintain for the private citizen some type of remedy when
he has suffered actual harm resulting from libelous conduct. They
argued that the "Concept of a citizenry informed by a free and
unfettered press" is not an imperative when in conflict with the "con-
cept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being."115
Their solution, to restrict the plaintiff to recovery for actual damages,
was based upon the assumption that the fear of punitive damages
raises the real threat of self-censorship. By eliminating punitive
damages and destroying the spectre of self-censorship, these Justices
believed that the right of a private individual to demand reasonable
"II Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
112 Id. at 57. (Black, J., concurring). It should be noted that Justice Douglas
took no part in the discision; if he had, he would have quite possibly adhered to this
same rationale as he had in all prior cases.
"13 Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring).
114 Would this test mean that a person who is arrested forfeits all rights of
privacy as to other matters totally unrelated to the subject matter of his arrest.
"1 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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care by the press outweighs any remaining threat to first amendment
freedoms." 6
Justice Harlan's dissent was based upon the premise that the states
have a legitimate interest in imposing a standard of reasonable care
upon the press in cases involving private individuals. He too con-
tended that recovery should ordinarily be restricted to compensatory
damages, but, unlike Justices Stewart and Marshall, he was not
opposed to punitive damages in cases wherein "actual malice" could
be shown." 7 Although Justice Harlan agreed with the New York Times
rule, he disagreed with its application in this case because in his judg-
ment a standard of reasonable care in private defamation cases does
not threaten first amendment freedoms. Thus his chief dispute is not
with the basic tenets underlying the New York Times doctrine, but
with the extent of the breathing space required by that doctrine to
protect constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
The foregoing analysis of the opinions in Rosenbloom demon-
strates that the latest word in defamation may not be the last word
especially since the composition of the Court has changed appre-
ciably since that decision was rendered. However, it is unlikely that
any startling new test will be developed since opinions in Rosenbloom
appear to define the probable avenues of change. At one extreme is
the absolute privilege espoused by Justices Black and Douglas;" 8 at
the other is the reasonable care standard of Justices Stewart, Marshall
and Harlan." 9 In the middle is the plurality view announced in
Rosenbloom; only "actual malice" will give rise to liability for the
publication of matters of public concern. It is improbable that a
majority of the Court will support the extreme view of Justices
Black and Douglas. In light of the prominence of the New York
Times doctrine in all of the Court's major decisions in this area
since 1964, subsequent decisions probably will follow the test set forth
in Rosenbloom. This test affords the Court a sound standard for the
protection of first amendment freedoms, yet it is restrictive enough to
deter the press from blatant or malicious libel. By balancing the
desired goals of protecting publishers from prosecution for honest
mistake, thereby maintaining a free press and an informed populace,
and protecting individuals from licentious journalism the Court has
produced an admirable aplication of the New York Times rule.
116 Id. at 83. This rationale is in sharp contrast to Justice Brennan's statement
in the main opinion that the "very possibility of litigation may be a threat." Id. at
52-53.
1171 Id. at 72. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118 See notes 62 and 112 supra and accompanying text.
119 See notes 115 and 117 supra and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
This note has examined the present state of common law libel as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivarn
120
through Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.121 Rosenbloom is the culmi-
nation of a step by step extension of freedom of the press at the expense
of state libel laws which the Court considers necessary if first amend-
ment freedoms are to remain viable in our society. The Court has
sought to find the proper balancing test which will be dispositive of
conflict between libel law and first amendment freedoms. The
divergence of opinions by the Justices of the Court makes predictions
of future developments difficult. However, a critical analysis of the
key cases discloses the predominant theme that our democracy is
based upon a knowledgeable populace informed by a free and unre-
strained press. The Rosenbloom test is a highly functional tool for the
protection of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms from infringment
by state libel laws. Frank H. Warnock
ADDENDUM
The United States Supreme Court, on June 25, 1974,122 handed down a most
significant decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 123 In this opinion Mr. Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court, redefined the liability of a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehoods about a private individual. In the process of promulgating
its new rule, the Court, placing considerable emphasis on the fact that Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, InC.124 was only a plurality opinion, rejected the Rosenbloom test of
"public or general interest" which necessitated invoking the New York Times rule.
While emphasizing its adherence to the New York Times rule where public
officials and public figures are involved, the Court struck a delicate balance be-
tween the competing interests of an uninhibited press and a private individual in-
jured by defamatory falsehoods. The Court chose to come down on the side of
the individual. Noting that public officials and public figures enjoy a geater ac-
cess to means of communication and assume the risk of defamatory falsehoods, the
Court found that neither of these factors is present regarding a priviate individual.
Hence recognizing the need for greater protection of private individuals, the
Court held that
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injuries to a private individual.125
At the same time that it chose to redefine the law in this area, the Court strove
to soften the blow with regard to damages. Where the "knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth"126 standard is not utilized in a suit by a private in-
dividual, the Court held that neither presumed nor exemplary damages are recover-
able. Hereafter, a plaintiff's damages are restricted to actual injury.
Inevitably, there will be those who decry this sudden shift from a test of
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth" to a standard of negligence.
It is, of course, too early to predict what effects the Gertz test will have on jour-
nalistic endeavors. But perhaps those critical of this opinion may find some solace
in Mr. Justice Blackmun's judgment that Gertz "will have little, if any, practical
effect on the functioning of responsible journalism."' 27
120 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 121403 U.S. 29 (1971).
122 The decision analyzed in this addendum had not been delivered at the
time the foregoing note had been completed. A study of the law of libel, however,
would be deficient without any reference to this case.
123 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
124 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 125 94 S. Ct. at 3010 (footnote omitted).
126 Id. at 3011. 127 Id. at 3014 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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